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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JAMES A. HATCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

vs.

Civil No.

THAIR H. BLACKBURN,
Defendant.
THAIR H. BLACKBURN,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. BENEDICT'S ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals apply a more strict

standard than that standard followed by the Supreme Court when
it refused to consider the merits of the Appellants challenges
to the trial court's findings?
2.

Did the Appellant discharge his duty to marshall

all of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding bv
setting forth the evidence in his Statement of the Case?
3.
even when

Did the Appellant attempt to demonstrate that

considering

all

the facts supporting

the trial

court's findings, such evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court's findings?
4.

Should the merits of Appellant's appeal have

been considered by the Court of Appeals?

-2REFERENCE TO OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision
on or about May 16f 1990.

A copy of said Memorandum Decision

is attached as an Addendum to this Petition.
JURISDICTION
The Memorandum Decision sought to be reviewed was
filed by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1990.

The Appellant

petitioned the Court for re-hearing on May 30, 1990.

Upon

receipt of the Petition for Re-Hearing, the Court of Appeals
ordered the entire record to be transmitted to the Court from
the District Court pending the decision on the Petition for
Re-Hearing.

Having finally received the entire record, the

Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Re-Hearing on August
28, 1990.

It is believed that Rules 4 and 46 of Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure confer upon the Supreme Court iurisdiction
to review the decision in question by writ of certiorari.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a judgment for architects fees.
The Plaintiff-Appellant (Hatch) is a developer who was attempting to develop real property owned by St. Benedict's, a Third
Party Defendant below but not a party to this appeal.
Defendant-Respondent

The

(Blackburn) is an architect whose ser-

vices were used by Hatch in securing a long term lease with
St. Benedict's.

The actions of the parties came before the

-3Honorable Ronald Hyde of the Second

District Court in and for

Weber Countyf State of Utah on February 11, 1988.
court rendered judgment in favor of Blackburn.
the decision to the Utah Supreme Court.

The trial

Hatch appealed

Pursuant to its

statutory authority, the Utah Supreme Court transmitted the
case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
advised

through oral argumentf

After beinq briefed and

the Utah Court of Appeals

rendered its Memorandum Decision affirming the trial court's
judgment.
In 1983, Hatch had approached St. Benedict's with a
proposal for the building of a medical office building on
property adjacent to the St. Benedict's Hospital.

T.8, 158.

As a result of those discussions, St. Benedict's granted Hatch
an option to lease up to four (4) acres of land.

Because St.

Benedict's wanted to review a site plan of the proposed building before entering into the long-term lease, Hatch requested
Blackburn to prepare the drawings.

T.8f 158.

It was antici-

pated between Hatch and Blackburn that a standard form architect
agreement (AIA Agreement) would be entered into between them,
similar to their agreements in the past.

T.12.

However,

before any agreement was signed, St. Benedict's decided aqainst
the project.
Hatch was able to revive the project and then again
requested Blackburn to provide the necessary drawings. Because
of the change in demands of St. Benedict's, Blackburn was

-4requested to prepare several different versions of the proposed building.

He went through at least five (5) schematics

before finally meeting the approval of St. Benedict1s.

Havinq

met with their approval, St. Benedict's entered into a loner
term lease with Hatch on or about May 16, 1986.

By August

1986/ Hatch notified Blackburn to go full steam ahead with the
project and to prepare a written agreement to be submitted
with the finance package.

T.191f 194.

At about the same

time, Blackburn received $10,000.00 from Hatch as required
under the AIA Agreement prepared by Blackburn.
During this time, Blackburn presented a second AIA
standard form agreement to Hatch for his signature.

However,

before the agreement was executed by the parties, St. Benedict's again had a change of heart and indicated that it
wanted to be released from its obligations under the lease
agreement.

Hatch was requested to submit a proposal for the

buy out of the lease.

As part of that proposal, he was asked

to submit those expenses that he had incurred on the project.
Hatch then requested Blackburn to prepare his final billing so
that a figure could be negotiated with St. Benedict's. Accordingly, Blackburn prepared his October 18, 1986 billing.
The October 18, 1986 billing set forth the architect
fees based on the percentages found
submitted

to Hatch for signature.

in the AIA Agreement
Those percentages were

calculated against Blackburn's estimate of construction costs.

-5It included termination fees of $65f724.00 with a reference to
Article 10.4 of the AIA Agreement for those fees.

Tt also

included $27/647.75 for those services that were rendered in
the beginning when the project was originally cancelled by St.
Benedict's.
The October 18, 1986 billing was used by Hatch in
his negotiations with St. Benedict's.

Had St. Benedict's

known that Blackburn's bill could not be substantiated, St.
Benedict's likely would have negotiated for a lower figure.
Dan Wolterman depo. pg. 24.

A release was subsequently nego-

tiated and Hatch released St. Benedict's from its obligations
under the lease.

Hatch subsequently paid Blackburn another

$18,000.00 for his fees.

T.260.

Fearing Hatch would not pay all of his billed fees,
Blackburn filed a lien on the property

in December 1986.

Receiving notice of Blackburn's lienf St. Benedict's withheld
its agreed payments from Hatch.

Hatch then brought suit

against Blackburn to have the lien removed.
sued for his fees.

Blackburn counter

In addition/ he brought a third party

action against St. Benedict's for foreclosure of his lien.
The action came before the Honorable Ronald Hyde of
the Second District Court. Hatch and Blackburn each testified.
They also offered expert testimony through other architects.
Blackburn's witnesses testified that Blackburn's

fees were

-6reasonable.

In addition to the expert witnesses and the

parties testimonies, the depositions of two of St. Benedict's
employees were offered

into evidence.

After hearing

the

evidence, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting
judgment to Blackburn for the total amount of his October 18f
1986 billing.
sented

the

The Court found that the AIA Agreement repre-

fees

agreed

Blackburn were reasonable.

to

and

that

the

fees

sought by

It also found that the reasonable

value of Blackburn's services were the fees billed, less the
termination fees.
ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) explained the standard for
review of a judge's findings.
When an appellant claims that the evidence is
insufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact, we do not weigh the evidence de
novo; great deference is given to the trial
court's findings, especially when they are based
on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony.
(Citations omitted). When the appeal is from a
juries fact finding, we have said that the
appellant has the obligation to marshall all the
evidence in support of those findings and,
considering that evidence in a light most favorable to the jury, still demonstrate that the
findings lack substantial evidentiary support.
(Citations omitted).
The burden of proof is
somewhat less when the appeal is from a judge's
findings because we need only conclude that the
findings are clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a),
but the mode of presentation and demonstration
that must be followed by an appellant is the
same. An appellant must marshall the evidence
in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be
"against the clear weight of the evidence", thus
making them "clearly erroneous".
(Citation
omitted). Whether the facts have been found by

-7a jury or a judge, appellant should recognize
that the burden of overturning factual findings
is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we
do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed
facts.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals has concluded that Hatch did not meet his burden because he failed to
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in a light
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings.

The Appellate Court concluded that

instead of doing this, Hatch simply emphasized his own evidence which is contrary to the findings.

The Court therefore

declined to reach the merits of Hatch's challenge to the trial
court's findings.
The conclusions of the Court of Appeals are erroneous
for the following reasons.

In his statement of the case,

Hatch set forth the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings that Hatch retained Blackburn's architectural services
and agreed to pay the fees set forth in the AIA Agreements.
After setting forth the evidence, Hatch then demonstrated that
the facts which the Court would have relied upon in its findings were insufficient to support those findings. Soecifically,
the evidence supporting the court's findings were:
1)

Blackburn's testimony as to his understanding of

the Agreement;

-82)

The testimony of Blackburn's expert witnesses as

to the reasonableness

of the fees set forth in Blackburn's

October 18, 1986 billing;
3)

Hatch's use of the October 18, 1986 billing in

his negotiations with St. Benedict's.
Hatch

challenged

the

trial

court's

findings

by

demonstrating that the evidence referred to above was insufficient to support those findings for the following reasons:
1)

Blackburn's testimony concerning the calculation

of the figures in the October 18, 1986 billing were inconsistent with the provisions of the AIA Agreement which he was
seeking to have enforced.

This inconsistency was argued in

the following areas:
a)

Blackburn's inclusion of $27,647.75 in the

October 18, 1986 billing representing the work done prior
to St. Benedict's first cancellation was inconsistent with
Blackburn's

own

being worked

admissions

that

there was

one

proiect

on as well as being inconsistent with the

terms of the AIA Agreement;
b)

The

termination

fees were

inconsistent

with the plain language of the AIA Agreement.
was made to the AIA Agreement.

Reference

In fact, the AIA Agreement

was the only evidence where such penalties were established by
parties;

the evidence

as being

agreed

to between

the

-9c)
costs"

The fees are calculated from "construction

as estimated

by Blackburn.

costs" are inconsistent with

These

"construction

the provisions of the ATA

Agreement.
2)

The expert testimony related to the percentages

charged for the penalty in the regular fees rather than the
total fee charged by Blackburn.

This argument was supported

by the admission to confusion between the witnesses over how
termination penalties should be calculated, if they are to be
calculated;
3)

The

findings

relative

to Hatch's use of the

October 18, 1986 billing were challenged by arguing the following:
a)

Blackburn's own conduct contradicted the

Court's findings;
b)

The depositions of Carol Stuckey and Dan

Wolterman contradicted the Court's findings.
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, Hatch argued
that the Court's conclusions were contrary to the law in the
following ways:
1)

The Court cannot fabricate a contract for the

parties, especially in regards to penalties;

-102)

The October 18, 1986 billing is not enforceable

as a separate contract because of a lack of consideration;
3)

Estoppel is not available as a theory because

Blackburn did not rely on Hatch's actions to his detriment.
By declining to reach the merits of Hatch's challenges to the findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
has set a standard higher than that standard set by the Supreme
Court.

Hatch had marshalled together the evidence supportinq

the trial court's findings and has attempted to demonstrate
that the trial court's findings are against the clear weight
of the evidence.

Hatch recognizes that great deference is

given to the trial court's findings and that the burden of
overturning the trial court's findings is a heavy one.
not seeking

to have

the Appellate

Court retry

He is

the matter.

However, he is seeking to enforce his right to appeal, which
the Court of appeals has effectively withdrawn by its overly
restrictive standard for review.

The Supreme Court's power of

supervision

is therefore needed and requested

this right.

The merits of Hatch's appeal must be considered.

DATED this

in protectinq

day of September, 1990.

Kevin V. Olsen
Attorney for Appellant

-11CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari
on this

day of September, 1990f postage prepaid to:
Michael D. Lyon
4768 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
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James A. Hatch,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Thair H. Blackburn,

Case No. 880503-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

Second District, Weber County
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde
Attorneys:

Kevin V. Olsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Michael D. Lyon, Ogden, for Appellee

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
This case was tried to the court. There was conflicting
evidence presented by the parties. Following trial, the court
issued a detailed memorandum decision, from which followed the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court's
factual findings in this case adequately support its legal
conclusions and the legal conclusions warrant the judgment that
was entered.
Hatch makes several arguments on appeal, but in essence
he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings. However, the trial court's findings are not
properly challenged unless the evidence is correctly marshaled
and shown to be insufficient. "To mount a successful attack on
the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). See In re Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Harker v. Condominiums
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Hatch has not done this, but instead has simply emphasized his
own evidence which is contrary to the findings. He suggests
the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence.

The fact that Hatch's evidence may have supported
different findings—or even that much of the evidence is at
odds with the findings—is of no consequence where the findings
that were made are not shown, through the marshaling process/
to have been lacking adequate evidentiary support. See
Mountain States Broadcasting Co, v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When the duty to marshal is not properly
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges to
the findings and accept the findings as valid."). This result
is particularly appropriate where the key findings turn on the
credibility determinations of the trial court, a matter on
which we defer to that court's advantaged position. See
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)The single argument on appeal that survives the foregoing
discussion is Hatch's claim that he is not liable for payment
under the contract due to the ultimate frustration of the
contract's purpose. Although the trial court made no findings
or conclusions on this issue, Hatch claims that the court
committed legal error in not precluding recovery by Blackburn
on the grounds of frustration. While we doubt whether this
doctrine would apply to the facts of this case, we need not
consider the issue since it was not raised below and we will
not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
See, e.g.. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins.
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1988).
While Hatch's appeal is not frivolous, as Blackburn
suggests, it is without merit. The judgment is accordingly
affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

880503-CA
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, AUG 2-3M990
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
James A. Hatch,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

ORDER DENYING REHEARING
Case No. 880503-CA

Thair H. Blackburn,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Orme.
The court having considered the ^petition for rehearing and
the additional portions of the record filed in this Court on
May 31, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
denied.
DATED this 28th day of August, 1990.

FOR THE COURT

Gregory^. Orme, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING REHEARING was
deposited in the United States mail.
Kevin V. Olsen
Anderson & Dunn
Attorneys at Law
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Michael D. Lyon, Esq,
Lyon, Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones
Attorney for Thair Blackburn
4768 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
DATED this 29th day of August, 1990.

By

^ ///'/>' ..
Deputy Clerk
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